Declaring War on the Environment: The Failure of International Environmental Treaties During the Persian Gulf War by Kelly, Katherine M.
American University International Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 4 Article 5
1992
Declaring War on the Environment: The Failure of
International Environmental Treaties During the
Persian Gulf War
Katherine M. Kelly
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kelly, Katherine M. "Declaring War on the Environment: The Failure of International Environmental Treaties During the Persian Gulf
War." American University International Law Review 7, no. 4 (1992): 921-950.
DECLARING WAR ON THE ENVIRONMENT: THE
FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
TREATIES DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
Katherine M. Kelly*
INTRODUCTION
The war in the Persian Gulf involving Iraq, the Allied forces and the
United States demonstrated that governments relegate environmental
concerns to the background when they resort to military actions to
solve international disputes. Vast destruction of marine and desert eco-
systems, as well as alteration of the atmosphere, occurred in a short
time period during the Gulf War.' The present international legal
framework designed to prevent ecological devastation during military
hostilities is ineffective. This Comment examines current international
treaties, addresses their weaknesses, and suggests ways in which they
can be strengthened to deter or punish potential perpetrators of envi-
ronmental destruction in the course of warfare.
Part I describes the history of environmental modification warfare,
and the extent to which armed forces carried out such ecological de-
struction during the Persian Gulf War. Part II analyzes current inter-
national treaties designed to prevent large-scale environmental devasta-
tion during military hostilities. In addition, Part II delineates post-
conflict actions taken by states, the United Nations, and other interna-
tional organizations to restore the environment and to elicit compensa-
tion from the perpetrators of ecological destruction. Finally, Part II ex-
plores steps that the United Nations should have taken at the end of
the Gulf War to enforce treaties against Iraq prohibiting environmental
modification warfare. Part III suggests alterations to strengthen ex-
isting treaties prohibiting environmental modification warfare that may
prevent such monumental ecological ruin in future armed conflicts.
* J.D. Candidate, 1993, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. See e.g., Frank Barnaby, The Environmental Impact of the Gulf War, 21 THE
ECOLOGIST 166, 168 (1991) [hereinafter Barnaby] (stating that the Gulf War was the
most environmentally damaging war in history). Official secrecy and a lack of indepen-
dent scientific assessment of the damage frustrated measurement of the environmental
impact of the war. Id. at 166.
2. Id. at 172. Conventions to prevent environmental destruction during warfare
lack the detail, clarity, and authority to restrict ecological damage. Id. Furthermore,
because the terms of the treaties are ambiguous, they can be easily manipulated to
provide self-interested interpretation. Id.
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I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. THE HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION
Environmental modification and destruction have been problems
throughout the history of warfare.' For centuries armies have used en-
vironmental warfare, or the military manipulation of battle terrain and
the elements, to destroy the enemy.4 Environmental warfare has be-
come increasingly complex as military technology has advanced.5
One of the earliest examples of strategic military destruction of the
environment occurred during the Punic Wars of the third century B.C.,
when armies poisoned wells, ruined crops, and destroyed arable land
with salt.' Similar environmental modification has occurred during mil-
itary actions up to the present day. During the Franco-Dutch War of
1672-1678, the Dutch destroyed their own dikes in an effort to flood
the land to prevent the French army from conquering the Nether-
lands. 7 In the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, a more devas-
tating use of flooding occurred.' The British destroyed major dams in
the Ruhr Valley during World War II, and the Germans followed suit
by intentionally flooding farmland in the Netherlands with salt water.,
The United States used similar flooding tactics by bombing irrigation
dams in North Korea during the Korean War,"0 but the most extensive
and technologically advanced American use of environmental warfare
occurred during the Vietnam War. Dense vegetation thwarted Ameri-
can military efforts in Vietnam, which led to rapid research for meth-
ods to control the environment in order to suppress the Viet Cong guer-
3. See Michael G. Renner, Military Victory, Ecological Defeat, 4 WORLD WATCH
27, 33 (1991) [hereinafter Renner] (asserting that warfare and environmental protec-
tion have always been ultimately antagonistic).
4. Id.
5. See id. (stating that as advanced technology increases the range, power, and
speed of weapons, the environmental impact of warfare also grows). Modern industrial
sites become obvious targets during warfare, many of which have the potential to un-
leash widespread destruction on the environment. Id.
6. Id. at 33.
7. See Arthur H. Westing, Environmental Warfare, 15 ENVTL. L. 645, 651 (1985)
[hereinafter Westing] (explaining the Dutch creation of the Holland Water Line).
8. Id. In 1938, the Chinese destroyed the Huayuankow dike on the Yellow River
in order to slow advancing Japanese troops. The resulting flood drowned thousands of
Japanese soldiers, destroyed large tracts of farmland, and killed hundreds of thousands
of Chinese civilians. Id. The river was not contained again until 1947. Id.
9. Id. at 652. In May 1943, the British demolished the Mohne and Eder dams,
severely affecting local industry and the environment. Id. In 1944, German troops
ruined 200,000 hectares of farmland in the Netherlands with sea water, requiring ma-
jor rehabilitation efforts to return the land to a productive state. Id.
10. Id. The Americans considered this program to be one of their most successful
air operations. Id.
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rillas." The American military employed several modern techniques to
clear the rainforests and slow the movement of the Viet Cong.12 Ameri-
can armed forces utilized herbicides and defoliants to clear the jungle
and reduce food supplies.'3 The United States Army used large, bladed
tractors known as "Rome ploughs" in this deforestation effort.14 In its
most technologically advanced action, the military attempted to use
"cloud-seeding" techniques to increase rainfall in certain areas in order
to slow guerilla actions and to impede the supply maneuvers of the
North Vietnamese Army.'5
B. ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION IN THE GULF WAR
In early 1991, Iraq used less technologically advanced, but more de-
structive, environmental modification warfare. During the Gulf War,
Iraqi forces used Kuwait's petroleum-producing facilities to decimate
the environment in an attempt to thwart the efforts of the Allied
forces. 6 Bombings and the movement of military hardware through the
desert caused vast ecological destruction. 17 Experience has shown that
II. See Lawrence Juda, Negotiating a Treaty on Environmental Modification
Warfare: The Convention on Environmental Warfare and Its Impact Upon Arms Con-
trol Negotiations, 32 INr'L ORG. 975, 976 (1978) (inferring that the United States
considered environmental modification techniques necessary to interfere with the guer-
rilla tactics of the North Vietnamese). Guerrilla warfare in Vietnam was based on the
teachings of Mao Tse-Tung, who stressed the need for quick and effective actions to
surprise the enemy. Id. Such warfare required the guerrillas to use the natural envi-
ronment for cover and camouflage during attack, and to disguise supply bases. Id. By
destroying the environment itself, the American military hoped to expose and defeat
the Viet Cong. Id.
12. Id. During the Vietnam War, environmental modification was widely employed
for the first time. Id. While nearly all types of warfare cause a detrimental impact on
the environment, the main purpose of environmental modification warfare is ecological
manipulation. Id. Destruction of the enemy is sought through the alteration of natural
processes. Id. Thus, environmental destruction is not merely a consequence of other
military objectives, it is the military objective. Id.
13. See id. (stating that the United States military purposefully manipulated the
environment in order to make it less hospitable to guerilla warfare).
14. Id. The Vietnam War afforded the United States the opportunity to test many
new weapons and strategies. Id.
15. Id.
16. See infra section B(l) (explaining the Iraqi military objectives of the oil spills);
see also infra notes 146-148 and accompanying text (articulating the theory that the
oil well fires were created to defend retreating Iraqi troops and to destroy Kuwait's
economic base); see also Jennifer Parmalee, Kuwaiti Emir Snuffs Our Last Iraqi-Lit
Oil Fire, WASH. PosT, Nov. 7, 1991, at Al [hereinafter Parmalee] (noting that the oil
well fires were set by retreating Iraqi soldiers).
17. See Renner, supra note 3, at 31 (observing that military vehicles placed major
burdens on the desert ecosystem). Tanks and other heavy vehicles disturbed the soil
and uprooted plants with root systems close to the surface, thereby adding to erosion.
Id. See also Barnaby, supra note 1, at 171 (explaining that carpet bombing, the move-
ment of military equipment, and the use of bulldozers to create trenches, all severely
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it takes extensive time for a desert ecosystem to recover from such dis-
ruption.'" By setting fire to oil wells and refineries, and by releasing
millions of barrels of crude oil into the Persian Gulf, the Iraqi military
created what has been called "the worst man-made environmental dis-
aster in history."' 9
1. Fires
At the end of the Gulf War approximately 600 oil wells were on fire
in Kuwait, and another 80, while not burning, were releasing large
amounts of oil.20 In the Greater Burgan region alone, 350 wells were
aflame.2 ' At that time, fires consumed about three million barrels of oil
per day and smoke spread as far as 800 miles south of Kuwait. 2 The
dense smoke drastically affected regional weather, and caused signifi-
cant drops in temperature. 23 The smoke emitted from the fires blocked
sunlight and released vast quantities of pollutants into the atmo-
affected the desert). These operations loosened the surface of the desert, greatly in-
creasing the likelihood of sandstorms. Id. See also John H. Cushman, Environmental
Toll Mounting in Kuwait as Oil Fires Burn On, N.Y. TibiEs, June 25, 1991, at C4
[hereinafter Cushman] (stating that, to a large extent, the oil well fires also directly
harmed the desert). Oil residue from the fires coated the desert, decreasing soil perme-
ability and affecting seed germination and microbes. Id. Additionally, plants died be-
cause sunlight was obscured by smoke, and because oil coated their leaves, reducing
their ability to absorb carbon dioxide. Id.
18. See Renner, supra note 3, at 31 (extrapolating from damage estimates of past
desert military operations). Deserts in Libya are still recovering from World War II,
and the Negev Desert in Israel still shows the scars of warfare in 1967 and 1973. Id.
The Mojave Desert in California also remains damaged from military operations car-
ried out during the 1940s. Id. Judging by these examples, the Kuwaiti desert will face
a similarly slow recovery. Id.
19. Michael Ross, Experts Blame Saudis, Kuwaitis As Spill, Oil Fires Go Un-
checked, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1991, at A10 [hereinafter Ross]. Destroyed Kuwaiti oil
wells and refineries released approximately 3,000 barrels of crude oil per day into the
Persian Gulf. Id.
20. See Cushman, supra note 17, at C4 (explaining the environmental impact of
the oil well fires); see also Parmalee, supra note 16, at Al (reporting that approxi-
mately 650 oil well fires had been set by Iraqi troops).
21. See Cushman, supra note 17, at C4 (delineating the extent of the oil well fires).
Greater Burgan is Kuwait's largest oil production complex. Id. It includes the oil fields
of Ahmadi, Magwa, and Burgan. Id.
22. Bob Davis, U.S. Scientists Play Down Effect of Fires in Kuwait, Angering En-
vironmentalists, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1991, at A3 [hereinafter Davis].
23. See id. (addressing climate changes in the Persian Gulf region). Bahrain, 250
miles south of Kuwait, reported its coldest May in 35 years with temperatures 7.5
degrees Fahrenheit below the normal average. Id. Scientists predicted that once the
fires were extinguished, the climate would again change. Id. Temperatures were ex-
pected to rise due to the absorption of heat by the oil covering the desert. Id.
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sphere. 4 In addition to environmental damage, smoke from these fires
threatened human health.25
Scientific opinion has differed on the global effects of the smoke.26
While "black snow," the fallout of atmospheric sulfur dioxide, was re-
ported over areas of Iran,27 it is not entirely clear if the smoke caused a
significant impact outside the Persian Gulf region. Despite the conflict-
ing opinions of scientific authorities, air samples as far away as Hawaii
contained unusually high levels of soot presumed to have come from
24. See Abdullah Toukan, The Gulf War and the Environment: The Need for a
Treaty Prohibiting Ecological Destruction as a Weapon of War, 15 FLETCHER F. oF
WORLD AFF. 95, 98 (1991) [hereinafter Toukan] (elaborating on the extent of the air
pollution problem). Toukan's article estimated that at the end of the Gulf War, ap-
proximately 400,000 tons of crude oil per day were burning, creating roughly 10,200
tons of sulphur dioxide, 2,550 tons of nitrogen dioxide, 42,840 tons of carbon monoxide,
and 285,600 tons of carbon dioxide on a daily basis. Id.
When sulphur and nitrogen oxide are released into the atmosphere, they react with
water to form sulfuric acid and nitric acid. Id. This mixture falls back to earth as acid
rain, causing soil contamination, groundwater pollution, and vegetation destruction. Id.
25. See John Travis, A Legacy of War, 140 Sc. NEws 24, 25-26 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter Travis) (indicating the way in which smoke from oil well fires may damage human
health). Small soot particles can easily become trapped in the lungs causing or exacer-
bating respiratory problems. Id. at 25. Measurements taken by the United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency showed high soot levels in the Kuwaiti air, consisting
mainly of small particles. Id. See also Matthew L. Wald, Experts Worried by Kuwait
Fires, N.Y. TimNFs, Aug. 14, 1991, at A7 [hereinafter Wald] (examining the short-term
and long-term effects of the Kuwaiti population's exposure to smoke from the oil well
fires). The article states that 50,000 persons in Kuwait will have their life expectancy
shortened because of the pollution. Id.
26. See Matthew L. Wald, No Global Threat Seen Front Oil Fires, N.Y. Tl,Es,
June 25, 1991, at C5 [hereinafter No Global Threat] (discussing allegations made by
the environmental group Friends of the Earth). Scientists at the National Science
Foundation and members of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), including
Administrator William Reilly, downplayed the global effects of the smoke, while envi-
ronmental groups claimed that National Science Foundation estimates were too con-
servative. Id. Friends of the Earth claimed that the federal government intentionally
understated Kuwait's environmental problems so as not to detract from the American
military success in the Gulf War. Id. See also Davis, supra note 22, at A3 (noting
similar allegations). Brent Blackwelder, Vice President of Friends of the Earth, dis-
agreeing with pollution reports compiled by the United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, stated that "the situation is out of control." id.
27. See Travis, supra note 25. at 26 (acknowledging the predictions of the British
Meteorological Office of widespread pollution and noting black snow reports). Acid
rain and smog was likely to be found up to 2,000 kilometers downwind of the Kuwaiti
fires. Id. See also Frederick Warner, The Environmental Consequences of the Gulf
War, 33 ENV'T 7, 9 (1991) [hereinafter Warner] (noting unusual weather conditions in
the Persian Gulf region).
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the Kuwaiti fires.28 Significantly, it took a monumental eight month
effort to quench the oil well fires in Kuwait.2 9
2. Oil Spills
In addition to the climatic and atmospheric modifications caused by
burning oil facilities, several extensive oil spills caused severe damage
to the Persian Gulf environment. 30 The amount of oil released into the
Gulf was estimated at two to three million barrels.3 '
It is assumed that Iraq created these spills to interfere with the Al-
lies' naval operations, such as amphibious landings on the shores of Ku-
wait.A2 By setting fire to the oil slicks, the Iraqis would have driven
28. See Soot Over Hawaii Presumed to Come from Kuwait, 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep.
(BNA) No. 9, at 268 (May 8, 1991) (speculating that the effects of Kuwaiti oil well
fires may have reached the Pacific Ocean). Air samples taken in Hawaii from February
to April 1991 contained twenty times the normal concentration of soot, and the high
levels are believed to be the result of the fires in Kuwait. Id. See also U.N. Virtually
Out of Money to Pay to Combat Pollution from Gulf Oil Fires, 10 Int'l Envtl. Rep.
(BNA) No. 14, at 401 (July 17, 1991) [hereinafter Int'l Envtl. Rep., July 17, 1991]
(indicating the extent of environmental effects from the Gulf War). The World Health
Organization and the World Meteorological Organization reported that the pollution's
effects reached Chad and the South Pacific. Id.
29. See Parmalee, supra note 16, at Al (reporting the success of fire-fighting oper-
ations). The last oil well fires were extinguished after an eight-month effort, employing
approximately 10,000 workers from 16 companies. Id. But see William Booth, Fires
in Kuwait Not a Threat to Global Climate, WASH. POST, June 25, 1991, at A3 [here-
inafter Booth] (speculating on the length of time it would take to put out the fires in
Kuwait). Oil well firefighter Red Adair testified before Congress in June 1991 that it
could take up to five years to quench the fires if efforts remained at their current level.
Id.
30. The Spoils of War, 28 U.N. CHRON., June 1991, at 17 [hereinafter Spoils of
War]. The first spill, on January 22, 1991, emanated from two Iraqi oil tankers in the
northern Persian Gulf. Id. See also Toukan, supra note 24, at 96 (listing the sources
and chronology of the oil spills). A subsequent spill occurred in an oil terminal near
Khafji, followed by two others at Kuwait's Sea Island terminal and Iraq's terminal at
Mina Al Bakr. Id.
31. See Toukan, supra note 24, at 96 (describing the sources and extent of the oil
spills). But see Spoils of War, supra note 30, at 17 (voicing Saudi Arabia's charge that
Iraq actually spilled over 10 million barrels of oil into the Persian Gulf). See also
Renner, supra note 3, at 30 (describing the size of the oil spills in the Persian Gulf).
The spills in the Persian Gulf were roughly equivalent in size to the Ixtoc oil well
catastrophe in 1979 in the Gulf of Mexico, the largest oil spill in history. Id. The
Persian Gulf spill was ten times larger than the Exxon Valdez spill. Id.
32. See Toukan, supra note 24, at 97 (speculating on Iraq's motives in creating the
oil spills). In the opinion of Abdullah Toukan, the Science Advisor to King Hussein of
Jordan, and Secretary General of the Jordanian Higher Council for Science and Tech-
nology, Iraq released large amounts of oil into the Persian Gulf to thwart Allied naval
maneuvers and to interfere with Saudi Arabian water supplies. Id. Saudi Arabia
blamed Iraq for all oil releases into the Persian Gulf. Id. But see Spoils of War, supra
note 30 (asserting that Iraq blamed the United States for the first oil spill by alleging
that the American military bombed the Iraqi tankers),
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ships away from the coast.3 3 Moreover, it is believed that these spills
were created to clog desalination plants in Saudi Arabia in order to
limit the supply of fresh water to troops and civilians, and to ruin the
water source for power plants and industrial centers. 3' The Iraqis
achieved neither goal. 5 Nevertheless, these tactics resulted in the wide-
spread destruction of the marine habitat.36 Estimates show that the re-
newal process may take anywhere from one to four years.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES PERTAINING TO ECOLOGICAL
DESTRUCTION DURING MILITARY HOSTILITIES
Despite the massive environmental destruction resulting from the
Gulf War, rules of international law exist to protect the environment
during military hostilities.3 8 The need for such rules became apparent
as a result of American military activities during the Vietnam War.39
33. See Toukan, supra note 24, at 97 (expanding on the reasons for creating the oil
slicks). Lighting the oil in the Persian Gulf would have created a massive wall of fire,
forcing the retreat of Allied naval forces to a safer location farther from shore. Id.
34. See id. (analyzing Iraqi goals of clogging desalination plants with oil). Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates all rely on
desalinated sea water for drinking water, power plants, and industrial centers. Id. Suc-
cessful interference with desalination plants could have caused suffering throughout the
Persian Gulf region. Id.
35. See id. (speculating that in order to obstruct Allied naval operations, an oil spill
of over 15 million barrels would have been required). The estimated 3 million barrels
of oil spilled realized no military objective, but severely damaged the marine ecosys-
tem. Id.
36. See Warner, supra note 27, at 26 (detailing the extent of losses in marine plant
and animal species). The oil slicks killed nearly 20,000 wading birds and affected popu-
lations of other marine animals, including sea turtles. Id. See also Spoils of War,
supra note 30, at 17 (stating that tortoises, sea turtles, marine birds, coral reefs,
beaches, lagoons, and other sections of the ecosystem were threatened by the oil spills).
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) sent a scientific team to the
region in February 1991. Id. Their report stated that the spills had caused "extensive
damage" to mangroves, fish breeding grounds and the habitats of endangered species.
Id.
37. See Warner, supra note 27, at 26 (noting that the natural circulation and geog-
raphy of the Persian Gulf may aid its rapid renewal, but that the impact of the spill
may still reach the Indian Ocean). But see Barnaby, supra note 1, at 170 (describing
the geography of the Persian Gulf). The Persian Gulf is small, shallow, and nearly
land-locked. Id. It is 1,000 kilometers long and 300 kilometers wide, with an average
depth of 35 meters. Id. Its only outlet is the 62-kilometer-wide Straits of Hormuz. Id.
Consequently, it may take a long time for the oil to disperse. Id.
38. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (citing treaties designed to safe-
guard the environment during warfare).
39. See Jozef Goldblat, The ENMOD Convention Review Conference, 7 DISARM4A-
MENT 93, 93 (1984) [hereinafter Goldblat] (stating that interest in new environmental
methods of warfare arose partially from rainmaking and mass destruction of vegetation
in Vietnam).
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In the 1970s, concern over the potential use of the environment for
military purposes, and fear that increasing military technology would
decimate the environment during modern military actions, spurred the
United Nations to develop two multilateral treaties which specifically
address these problems.4 The two treaties are Protocol (I) Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)41
and the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hos-
tile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques of 1977 (ENMOD
Convention) .42
Unfortunately, Iraq is not a party to Protocol I or the ENMOD Con-
vention.43 Iraq never signed or acceded to Protocol I, and thus it has no
legal duty to follow its provisions. 4 Similarly, because Iraq is only a
signatory to the ENMOD Convention, it cannot be bound by the con-
vention.4 5 As neither Protocol I nor the ENMOD Convention is a part
of customary international law, Iraq can in no way be bound by the
40. See id. at 94 (establishing the sequence of events which led the United Nations
to develop laws to protect the environment during warfare). A good example of the
development of these laws is the ENMOD Convention. Id. On July 11, 1973, the
United States Senate acknowledged the destructive potential of environmental modifi-
cation activities and adopted a resolution calling for the United States to enter agree-
ments with other nations to forbid such actions during warfare. Id. at 93-94. On July 3,
1974, the United States and the Soviet Union jointly called for an end to the threat of
environmental modification for military purposes. Id. at 94. On August 21, 1975, after
meetings between the two nations, the Soviet Union and the United States submitted
the same draft convention to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
(CCD) of the United Nations. Id. The CCD formed these proposals into the ENMOD
Convention. Id.
41. Protocol (I) Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, signed Dec. 12, 1977 [hereinafter Protocol I].
42. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Envi-
ronmental Modification Techniques, G.A. Res. 31/72, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39)
37, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1977) [hereinafter ENMOD Convention].
43. See Saddam: Eco-Criminal?, ENVTL. F., Mar. - Apr. 1991, 10, 10-11 [herein-
after Saddam: Eco-Criminal?] (noting that Iraq is not a party to Protocol I or the
ENMOD Convention).
44. See Louis HENKIN, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 408-12 (1987) [hereinafter
L. HENKIN] (explaining differences between signing and ratifying a treaty). There is
an important difference between signing and ratifying a convention. Id. A nation may
show an intent to be bound by a treaty by signing it. Id. However, ratification by a
certain number of states, which requires formal approval by a national legislative body,
may be necessary for the treaty to come into force. Id.
45. See U.N. DEP'T FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMA-
MENT YEARBOOK 1984, at 457 n.10, U.N. Sales No. E.85.IX.4 (1985) [hereinafter
DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK 1984] (listing the parties and signatories to the ENMOD
Convention). Several Middle Eastern nations are involved with the treaty, including
Democratic Yemen and Egypt as parties, and Iran, Turkey, and Iraq as signatories.
Id. See also L. HENKIN, supra note 44, at 408-12 (explaining the difference between
signature and ratification of a treaty).
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conventions without being a party.'6 Nevertheless, taking Iraqi actions
as an example, a party to Protocol I or the ENMOD Convention will
likely be bound if it acts similarly in future military hostilities.
1. Protocol I
The 1949 Geneva Conventions' do not directly address the problem
of environmental warfare. In 1977, in light of the Vietnam War, the
United Nations revised the 1949 Geneva Conventions by adding Proto-
col I which includes specific provisions aimed at limiting ecological de-
struction during armed conflicts.' 8 Article 35 of Protocol I forbids the
use of weapons and methods of warfare that may cause undue injury to
humans or the environment.' 9 Article 54, among other things, prohibits
46. See Saddanz Eco-Crininal?, supra note 43, at 11 (stating the opinion of the
United States Department of State). According to the Office of Legal Adviser in State,
Protocol I is not included in customary international law. Id. See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW § 102 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]
(maintaining that customary law is a source of international law). Section 102 states
that:
customary international law results from a general
and consistent practice of states followed by them
from a sense of legal obligation. [I]nternational
agreements create law for the states parties
thereto and may lead to the creation of
customary international law when such agreements
are intended for adherence by states generally and
are in fact widely accepted.
Id. In creating customary law, the length of practice may be rather short, and can be
considered generally accepted if it is widely followed among nations; universal accept-
ance is not necessary. Id. at comment b. See also GOLDBLAT, infra note 59, at 197
(delineating the text and basic information about Protocol I). Signed in 1977, Protocol
I has 33 parties. Id. See also DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK 1984, supra note 45, at 457
(presenting the text of the Final Declaration of the 1984 ENMOD Convention Review
Conference). Article IX notes that 45 nations have become parties to the ENMOD
Convention, and that 19 other nations have become signatories. Id. Article IX adds,
however, that the Conference is concerned that the treaty has not yet gained universal
acceptance. Id.
47. Geneva Conventions of 1949, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365,
75 U.N.T.S. 287.
48. See Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 49 (defining the scope of application of the
treaty). Protocol I applies to all attacks, whether by sea, air, or land, which may affect
civilian populations or civilian objects. Id. "Attacks," defined as offensive or defensive
acts of violence against the adversary, include those carried out in any territory. Id.
Such territory may include the national territory of a party to the conflict which is
under the control of an adverse party. Id. Article 49 of the Protocol describes a situa-
tion similar to that in Kuwait. For a brief history of the Geneva Conventions see JOZEF
GOLDBLAT, AGREEMENTS FOR ARMS CONTROL: A CRITICAL SURVEY 84-89 (1982).
49. See Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 35 (limiting the right of parties to choose
their weapons). Parties in armed conflicts may only use weapons which do not cause
"superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering." Id. Article 35 also states that parties
are forbidden to use "methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be
1992] 929
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
the attack and destruction of drinking water installations.5 Article 55
imposes broader prohibitions against environmental damage. 5' The lan-
guage of Article 56 forbids attacks on certain peacetime facilities hav-
ing dangerous potential. 2
On its face, Protocol I appears to be directly applicable to environ-
mental destruction similar to that resulting from the Gulf War. The
protocol's language restricts its application to the most serious circum-
stances, and the damage thresholds created by the terms "widespread,"
"long-lasting," and "severe" are very high.5 3 It appears, however, that
ecological damage like that inflicted on Kuwait and the Persian Gulf
could conceivably meet such threshold requirements. 4
expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environ-
ment." Id.
50. See id. art. 54 (prohibiting, inter alia, the attack or destruction of objects criti-
cal to the survival of the civilian population). Article 54 states, in part, that:
[i]t is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensa-
ble to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas
for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and
supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their
sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the
motive ....
Id. See also Barnaby, supra note 1, at 169 (noting damage to crops in the Gulf War).
Iraqi actions in Kuwait ruined a number of these protected items, especially agricul-
tural areas. Id. Agriculture was hampered by the oil spills, and by the oil well fires
which caused temperature drops and acid rain. Id.
51. See Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 55 (reiterating the need expressed in Article
35 to protect the environment during warfare). Article 55 states, in part, that "[c]are
shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-
term and severe damage." Id. This protection includes a prohibition on techniques of
warfare intended or expected to harm the natural environment in such a way that the
health or survival of the population is threatened. Id.
52. See id. art. 56 (characterizing the types of facilities that are prohibited as ob-jects of military attack). Article 56 states, in part, that "[w]orks or installations con-
taining dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating sta-
tions, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military
objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent
severe losses among the civilian population." Id.
53. See U.N. DEP'T FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND DIs-
ARMAMENT: A SHORT HISTORY 88-90, 89 (1988) [hereinafter U.N. AND DISARMA-
MENT: A SHORT HISTORY] (detailing the thresholds for the terms widespread, long-
lasting, and severe). Under the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament's defini-
tion of these terms, "widespread" means that the destruction must include at least
"several hundred square kilometres;" "long-lasting" means that it must last for "a pe-
riod of months, or approximately a season;" and "severe" is interpreted such that it
"should involve serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and
economic resources or other national assets." Id.
54. See Renner, supra note 3, at 29 (delineating the geographical scope of smoke
dispersion from the oil well fires). The thickest smoke was found over Kuwait, eastern
Iraq, and southwest Iran. Id. High smog levels, caused by the oil fires, were measured
up to 1,000 miles away in Bulgaria, Turkey, Romania, and the Soviet Union. Id.
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Because Kuwait's economy is based primarily on oil exports, it is
undeniable that the oil well destruction disrupted the nation's economic
resources.5 5 Thus, had Iraq been a party to the convention, it would
have violated Articles 35 and 55 of Protocol 1.56 Also, Iraq would have
violated Article 35 because pollutants released from oil well fires jeop-
ardized public health, especially the health of the young and those indi-
viduals with respiratory problems.57 In addition, Iraq would have vio-
lated Article 54 by attempting to disrupt desalination plants with oil
slicks. That action was an effort to interfere with civilian water supplies
which, if successful, would have caused severe hardship to the
population.58
See also Barnaby, supra note 1, at 170 (articulating the damage caused by the oil
spills). The Persian Gulf, already one of the world's most polluted bodies of water, is
further threatened by the spills. Id. Several species of birds and fish are in jeopardy,
and coastal industries, such as fisheries, are threatened. Id. The worst long-term prob-
lem from the spills is the possible destruction of oxygen-supplying plants in the Gulf.
Id.
The effects of the oil spills are likely to be felt for a long time because the Persian
Gulf's only outflow is the Straits of Hormuz, only 62 kilometers wide. Id. See also
Davis, supra note 22, at A3 (elaborating on temperature changes in Bahrain); see also
Barnaby, supra note 1, at 169 (recognizing similar climate changes in Kuwait). Tem-
peratures in Kuwait were 10 to 15 degrees Celsius lower than average, due to the
absorption of the sunlight by smoke clouds. Id. See also Parmalee, supra note 16, at
Al (reporting that it took eight months to quench the oil well fires).
55. See ABDUL-REVA AssIRI, KuWArT's FOREIGN PoucY, 143-46 (1990) (detail-
ing basic facts about Kuwait's population, lifestyle, geography, and economy). Based
on 1987 statistics, Kuwait produced approximately 1,215,000 million barrels of oil per
day and required only 88.4 thousand barrels per day for domestic consumption. Id. at
144. Kuwait, with 94.5 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves, holds approximately
10.3 percent of the world's oil reserves. Id. Its total annual exports amounted to S7.4
billion, with crude oil accounting for 81 percent of that total. Id. at 145.
56. See supra note 49 (citing the prohibitions under Article 35 of Protocol I); see
also Cushman, supra note 17, at C4 (noting the extent of damage to Kuwaiti oil facili-
ties). It is clear that the extensive damage to Kuwaiti oil production centers was "su-
perfluous injury" and that it caused "widespread, long-lasting, and severe" damage to
the environment. See also supra note 51 (citing prohibitions under Article 55 of Proto-
col I).
57. See Barnaby, supra note 1, at 169 (analyzing the health impact of the oil well
fires). Kuwaiti citizens with asthma, bronchitis, and other respiratory ailments suffered
the greatest harm from the pollution. Id. Further, a number of components of the
smoke are cancer-causing agents. Id. at 164-70. Kuwaiti doctors recommended that
persons with respiratory difficulties who fled Kuwait should not return. Id. at 170. See
also supra note 49 (declaring the prohibitions of Article 35 of Protocol I). Such dam-
age to public health may be seen as "superfluous injury" and "unnecessary suffering."
Id.
58. See supra note 50 (describing prohibitions under Article 54 of Protocol 1); see
also supra note 34 (analyzing military goals of the oil slick and its ramifications had it
been successful). Because so many nations in the Persian Gulf region rely on desalina-
tion plants for their civilian water supply, Article 54 was violated by the attempt to
interfere with such operations. Id.
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2. The ENMOD Convention
Just before the adoption of Protocol I, the United Nations adopted
the ENMOD Convention which similarly prohibits environmental mod-
ification warfare. 9 Like Protocol I, the ENMOD Convention emerged
from the anxiety over environmental destruction during wartime at the
end of the Vietnam War.60 The ENMOD Convention also responded to
general concern about international environmental protection expressed
in the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment in 1972.1 Cooperation between the superpowers hastened
the development of the ENMOD Convention, which the General As-
sembly passed in 1976.62
59. See JOZEF GOLDBLAT, ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS: A HANDBOOK 197-211
(1983) [hereinafter GOLDBLAT] (restating the text and relevant information about Pro-
tocol (I) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949). Protocol I was
signed on December 12, 1977 at Bern, Switzerland, and entered into force on Dccem-
ber 7, 1978. Id. See also Goldblat, supra note 39, at 95 (detailing the negotiating
history of the ENMOD Convention). The ENMOD Convention was signed on May 18,
1977, and came into force on October 5, 1978. Id.
60. See Goldblat, supra note 39, at 93 (indicating the influence of the Vietnam
War on the creation of the ENMOD Convention). Actions against the environment
during the Vietnam War sparked an interest in environmental modification techniques,
and consequently, a recognition of the need to control such manipulations through in-
ternational agreements. Id.
61. See Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 (1972) [hereinafter Declaration of Human Environment
Conference] (articulating the principles agreed upon at the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment held at Stockholm, Sweden, June 5-16, 1972). This docu-
ment proclaims, inter alia, that the earth's natural resources, including land, air, water,
flora, and fauna must be protected. Id. at Principle 2. Nations must take action to
prevent marine pollution that may harm human health or marine life, or interfere with
acceptable uses of the sea. Id. at Principle 7. Further, in relation to war, nations must
ensure that their actions do not harm the environment of other states or regions beyond
their national jurisdiction. Id. at Principle 21. See generally U.N. DEP'T FOR DIS-
ARMAMENT AFFAIRS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT: 1945-1985 at 125,
U.N. Sales No. E.85.IX.6 (1985) [hereinafter DISARMAMENT: 1945-1985] (elaborating
on the history of the United Nations' involvement in regulating environmental modifi-
cation techniques). The goal of many nations was to create an international convention
prohibiting artificial manipulation of the environment for military purposes before the
technology for such actions had been fully developed. Id. See also, DISARMAMENT
YEARBOOK 1984, supra note 45, at 453-54 (noting that in 1975, Sweden suggested that
the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) examine ways to prevent the
military use of meteorological change techniques).
62. See DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK 1984, supra note 45, at 454 (detailing the crea-
tion of the ENMOD Convention); see also supra note 40 (establishing the sequence of
events that led to the creation of the ENMOD Convention). Cooperation between the
United States and the Soviet Union was central to the smooth development of the
ENMOD Convention. DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK 1984, supra note 45, at 454. The
General Assembly adopted the convention under Resolution 31/72. Id. at 455. It was
opened for signature and ratification on May 18, 1977 at which time 34 nations be-
came signatories. Id. The ENMOD Convention entered into force on October 5, 1978
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The ENMOD Convention is unique because it is the first multilat-
eral disarmament agreement for which the Secretary-General of the
United Nations acts as the depositary.6 3 This gives the Secretary-Gen-
eral a definitive role in verifying adherence to the terms of the
convention.6 '
The terms of the ENMOD Convention are broader than the provi-
sions of Protocol 1.65 Article I of the ENMOD Convention prohibits
parties from using hostile techniques which may cause "widespread,
long-lasting or severe effects" on the environment.0 6 Article II defines
"environmental modification techniques. 6 7
The damage thresholds for "widespread, long-lasting or severe" are
the same as those under Protocol 1.68 Thus, environmental damage like
that in the Persian Gulf region would fall under this convention more
readily than under Protocol I, because the damage must satisfy only
one of the three requirements under Article I of the ENMOD Conven-
tion. 9 Although no party state has ever brought a violation of this
treaty to the attention of the United Nations,70 the accepted interpreta-
tion of ENMOD forbids only the use of the environment as a weapon,
after ratification by 20 nations. Id. As of December 31, 1984, 47 nations, including
Kuwait, Egypt, and the United States, had ratified it. Id. at 457, n.10.
63. Id. at 455.
64. Id. See also ENMOD Convention, supra note 42, art. V. Article V of the
ENMOD Convention allows the Secretary-General, at the request of a party, to con-
vene a Consultative Committee of Experts to investigate claims. Id. This committee
must report its findings to the Secretary-General, who in turn distributes the report to
all parties. Id.
65. GOLDBLAT, supra note 59, at 199.
66. See ENMOD Convention, supra note 42, art. I (delineating the terms of the
agreement). Article I states that parties may not "engage in military or any other
hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or
severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other state party."
Id.
67. Id. art. II. The definition of "environmental modification techniques" under Ar-
ticle II includes any method of altering the environment "through the deliberate ma-
nipulation of natural processes - the dynamics, composition or structure of the earth,
including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space." Id.
68. See U.N. AND DISARMAMENT: A SHORT HISTORY, supra note 53, at 89 (de-
lineating the thresholds for widespread, long-lasting, and severe).
69. ENMOD Convention, supra note 42, art. I.
70. See DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK 1984, supra note 45, at 463-65 (reiterating The
Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Tech-
niques). Article V of this document notes that no party has found it necessary to en-
force the provisions of Article V dealing with complaints and verification. Id. at 464.
Article IX of the Final Declaration also states the that six years that have passed since
the Convention entered into force has shown its strength. id. at 465.
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rather than simply prohibiting the destruction of the environment.'
Due to this narrow interpretation, the ENMOD Convention may not
apply to situations like the Persian Gulf War.72
Further, even among the parties to the ENMOD Convention, it is
unclear what type of reprimand or sanctions would be imposed for a
breach of the convention. The convention itself only loosely describes
the procedure for lodging a complaint and merely states that an investi-
gation may follow. 73 As the parties have never enforced the ENMOD
Convention, there is no precedent on dispute resolution or the imple-
mentation of sanctions against violators.74
Despite the apparent weaknesses of the ENMOD Convention, par-
ties to the agreement appear generally satisfied with its terms and ef-
fectiveness.7 5 Article VIII of the ENMOD Convention permits the par-
ties to hold review conferences.7 6 Accordingly, the parties held a
71. See Saddam: Eco-Criminal?, supra note 43, at 11 (discussing the scope of ap-
plication of the ENMOD Convention). The article notes that the ENMOD Convention
is meant to forbid the use of the environment as a weapon, such as creating floods to
kill troops, rather than to forbid harming the environment itself. Id. Therefore, al-
though the oil well fires and intentional oil spills during the Gulf War indisputably had
effects on the climate and ecosystems, the treaty does not apply. Id.
72. Id.
73. See ENMOD Convention, supra note 42, art. V (establishing steps to be taken
in the event that a party breaches the convention). Article V provides that any party
may lodge a complaint against another party with the Security Council. Id. The Coun-
cil may then call for an investigation of the charges. Id. The treaty does not specify,
however, what may happen if the accusations prove to be true. Id. Article V, para-
graph 2 simply states that the Depositary, within one month of receiving a complaint,
must convene a Consultative Committee of Experts. Id. Any state party may select an
expert for the Committee. Id. The Committee must report its findings to the Deposi-
tary, who will then distribute the report to all the parties. Id. The annex to the EN-
MOD Convention describes the guidelines for the Consultative Committee of Experts,
but does not mention how information from their report is to be used to enforce the
convention. Id. at annex.
74. See DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK 1984, supra note 45, at 463-64 (restating the
Final Declaration of the 1984 ENMOD Convention Review Conference). Article I of
the Final Declaration notes that all parties have carried out their obligations under the
ENMOD Convention, and articulates the parties' conviction that the convention will
continue to be successful in preventing hostile use of environmental modification tech-
niques. Id. See also supra note 70 and accompanying text (noting that no party has
ever called for enforcement of the treaty).
75. See DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK 1984, supra note 45, at 463-64 (noting the Re-
view Conference members' contentment with the ENMOD Convention). In addition to
the parties' satisfaction with success of the ENMOD Convention in preventing hostile
environmental modification, they are similarly pleased with the terms of the agreement.
Id. at 464. Article II of the Final Declaration of the Review Conference specifically
articulates the parties' satisfaction with the definition of "environmental modification
techniques" and its relation to the understandings of Articles I and II of the ENMOD
Convention. Id.
76. See ENMOD Convention, supra note 42, art. VIII (specifying the timing and
method of holding review conferences). According to Article VIII, review conferences
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conference to evaluate the convention in September 1984, during which
they reviewed the document and prepared a final declaration. 7 Despite
a number of complaints by some parties as to certain details of the
convention, 8 the final declaration stated that the ENMOD Convention
remains an effective means to prevent the use of environmental modifi-
cation techniques. Consequently, the parties reaffirmed their support
for the convention and its definitions.7 9
B. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CLEANING UP?
The weaknesses in Protocol I and the ENMOD Convention left a
large question looming in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War: who
is responsible for cleaning up the environmental damage?
Despite its inability to hold Iraq to any existing treaty governing en-
vironmental damage during military actions, the United States,
through congressional action, 80 and the international community,
are to be held "with a view to ensuring that its purposes and provisions are being
realized, and shall in particular examine the effectiveness of the provisions of para-
graph I of article I in eliminating the dangers of military or any other hostile use of
environmental modification techniques." Id. See also DISARMAMErT YEARBOOK 1984,
supra note 45, at 465 (reiterating the Final Declaration of the 1984 ENMOD Conven-
tion Review Conference). Article VIII of the Final Declaration notes the importance of
review conferences and states that another review conference should be held in Geneva
no earlier than 1989. Id.
77. See DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK 1984, supra note 45, at 457-58 (detailing the
conference agenda and participants). A diverse group of parties, signatories and organi-
zations participated in the conference, which consisted of debate and a review of the
convention's details. Id. Thirty-five parties, including Kuwait, the United States, and
the Soviet Union, attended the conference. Id. Four signatory nations, Brazil. Ethiopia,
Iran, and Turkey, along with four observer nations, Algeria, Peru, Switzerland, and
Argentina, also participated. Id. Representatives from the World Meteorological Or-
ganization (WMO) and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) also
attended the review meetings. Id.
78. See id. at 461-62 (discussing complaints by Sweden, Australia, Japan, Egypt,
and New Zealand that the terms of the convention were inadequate to ensure protec-
tion of the environment). Sweden agreed that the convention was valuable, but stated
that the point at which damage is considered to be a breach of the convention was too
high, and thus would allow perpetrators to carry on extensive environmental warfare
without violating the treaty. Id. Australia maintained that the scope of the convention
was too narrow. Id. Japan believed that some terms were ambiguous and noted the lack
of a clear definition of "environmental modification techniques" when the convention
was originally negotiated. Id. Egypt noted that the methods of handling complaints and
verification were unsatisfactory. Id. at 462. New Zealand also complained about inade-
quacies in the scope, verification, and compliance provisions. Id.
79. See id. at 463-65 (restating the Final Declaration of the Review Conference).
80. See H.R. Res. 108, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991), (recommending the use of a
portion of Iraq's oil profits to pay for the clean up efforts in the Persian Gulf region).
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through the United Nations,"' called for Iraq to make monetary repa-
rations which are intended to be compensatory in nature.82 Iraq is to
pay for the services of the international teams who cleaned up the oil
spills and extinguished the oil well fires.83
1. Clean Up Operations
Various organizations participated in the cleanup efforts in the Per-
sian Gulf region.84 In early March 1991, the United Nations sent spe-
cial missions to Kuwait to investigate war damage, including health
and environmental problems stemming from the Iraqi invasion.8 5 Later,
the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) created a task
force to conduct a detailed 90-day study of the environmental
destruction. 8
Several American groups also studied the impact of the war on the
environment.8 7 The National Science Foundation sent a team of inves-
tigators to the region, as did the environmental public interest group
81. See S. Res. 687, U.N. Doe. S/RES/687, 7, 7 (1991) [hereinafter Resolution
687] (declaring Iraq's liability for environmental damage and other injuries stemming
from the invasion and occupation of Kuwait).
82. See S. Res. 674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/674, 3, 3 (1990) [hereinafter Resolution
674] (invoking injured states to collect relevant information for claims against Iraq).
Paragraph 9 states that this data is to be used for "restitution or financial compensa-
tion by Iraq" within the scope of international law. Id. See also Resolution 687, supra
note 81, at 7 (reaffirming that Iraq must pay for environmental damages and the loss
of natural resources caused by its role in the Persian Gulf War). Paragraph 18 calls for
the creation of a fund to compensate victims who were harmed by Iraq. Id.
83. See infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text (describing the United Nations
compensation plan); see also H.R. Con. Res. 108, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991) (insist-
ing that Iraq pay 20 percent of its future oil revenues to reimburse parties for certain
costs of the Persian Gulf War).
84. See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text (describing the array of groups
that aided in clean up operations).
85. See War in Persian Gulf Area Ends, 28 U.N. CHRON., June 1991, at 5 [herein-
after War in Persian Gulf Area Ends] (reporting that missions were sent to investigate
the environment, health conditions and other issues in both Kuwait and Iraq); see also
Special Missions Assess War Damage, 28 U.N. CHRON., June 1991, at 15 [hereinafter
Special Missions] (addressing the findings of two United Nations missions sent to Ku-
wait in March and April 1991). The first mission, led by Under-Secretary-General
Martti Ahtisaari, studied the immediate humanitarian needs of the Kuwaiti people. Id.
The second mission, headed by former Under-Secretary-General Abdulrahim A.
Farah, sought information on deaths, infrastructure damage, and Iraqi actions against
Kuwaiti civilians. Id.
86. See Spoils of War, supra note 30, at 17 (delineating the focus of the study).
The investigation included a study of oil pollution, smoke emissions, and terrestrial
damage. Id. The task force included experts from the United Nations Environmental
Programme (UNEP), the World Health Organization, the Regional Organization for
the Protection of the Marine Environment, and various regional governments. Id.
87. See Davis, supra note 22, at A3 (observing that the National Science Founda-
tion and Friends of the Earth visited the Persian Gulf to assess the ecological damage).
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Friends of the Earth.88 Furthermore, William Reilly, the Administrator
of the United States Environmental Protection Agency, visited Kuwait
in early June 1991.89
Many groups also participated in the effort to fight oil well fires and
clean up oil spills. On April 10, 1991, the European Community Com-
mission unveiled a $20 million plan to combat oil well fires and protect
wildlife.9 0 The International Maritime Organization (IMO) launched a
Gulf Oil Pollution Disaster FundY1 Several American companies
worked to bring the oil well fires under control. 2 Additionally, Canada
sent equipment and experts to Kuwait to assist with oil cleanup in the
Gulf.93
Despite the wide range of international efforts, commentators com-
plained about the poor efforts on the part of the Saudi Arabian and
88. See Reports Clash Over Extent of Damage Resulting From Oil Fires in Ku-
wait, 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 369 (July 3, 1991) (citing differences in
the pollution reports of the National Science Foundation and Friends of the Earth).
While these groups differed on estimates of the level of pollution caused by the oil well
fires, both agreed that the fires had "wreaked havoc on Kuwait's environment." Id.
89. See William K. Reilly, Briefing on the Environmental Situation in Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia 5 (June 10, 1991) (transcript available from Heritage Reporting Corpo-
ration) (detailing the findings of Environmental Protection Agency Administrator
Reilly's trip to the Gulf region and stressing that the results of his study were not
final). Reilly stated that although the air pollution was bad, it had not caused the acute
respiratory problems originally feared by scientists. Id. Reilly also mentioned that other
departments in the federal government were working to assess the long-term and short-
term effects of the pollution. Id. These groups include the Department of Defense, the
Army Corps of Engineers, the National Centers for Atmospheric Research, the Cen-
ters for Disease Control, and the Public Health Service. Id.
90. See Commission Announces S20 Million Plan to Help Fight Pollution in Per-
sian Gulf, 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 222 (Apr. 24, 1991) (outlining the
European Community Commission plan). The program included training, and the crea-
tion of a model sanctuary, with a five-stage restoration plan. Id. The sanctuary plan
involved cleaning a heavily polluted zone, then creating a buffer zone around it. Id.
Training was provided to allow others to repeat the process in other areas. Id. Approxi-
mately $12 million of the money was earmarked for fire-fighting operations. Id.
91. See International Maritime Organization Launches Gulf Oil Pollution Disas-
ter Fund, 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 127 (Mar. 13, 1991) (detailing the
IMO's establishment of an environmental fund). The fund received pledges totalling S5
million from three undisclosed nations. Id.
92. See U.S. Giving "High Priority" to Requests for Help to Stem Gulf War
Damage, EPA Says, 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 339 (June 19, 1991) (nam-
ing the United States' Red Adair Company as one of several fighting oil well fires in
Kuwait). The United States Environmental Protection Agency reported that the
United States considered the Kuwaiti environment a high priority. Id. The United
States moved from an emergency operation to a long-term assistance program. Id.
93. See Canada Contributes to Persian Gulf Clean Up Efforts, 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep.
(BNA) No. 9, at 268 (May 8, 1991) (reporting the use of Canadian bioremediation
expertise). Canada sent airborne remote sensing devices and experts to help with the oil
spill clean up. Id. The Canadian contribution amounted to approximately S1.3 million,
in response to aid requests from Bahrain and Qatar. Id.
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Kuwaiti governments in the cleanup operations. 4 In addition, problems
arose when the United Nations almost ran out of funds to extinguish
oil well fires.9 5
2. U.S. Congressional Actions
In January 1991, the United States Congress began calling for Iraq
to take action in environmental rebuilding."' Several members of the
House of Representatives introduced a resolution condemning Iraq's
environmental destruction in the Persian Gulf. 7 Other resolutions
called for holding Iraq legally, morally, and financially responsible for
acts against the environment during the Gulf War.98 Still other resolu-
tions specifically advocated earmarking a portion of Iraq's oil profits as
94. See Ross, supra note 19, at A10 (voicing experts' and senators' dissatisfaction
with Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian clean up participation). Brent Blackwelder, vice presi-
dent of Friends of the Earth, testified before Congress that Exxon spent over $2 billion,
and employed more than 11,000 persons, to clean up the 260,000 barrels of oil spilled
from the Exxon Valdez. Id. In contrast, only $60 million, and approximately 400 per-
sons, were recruited to clean up the 2 to 4 million barrels of oil spilled into the Persian
Gulf during the war with Iraq. Id. Oil spill expert Richard Golob blamed Saudi Ara-
bia's unwillingness to provide continuing financial support for the clean up as a major
reason for the slow progress. Id. Golob noted Saudi Arabia's hesitation in spending
more money on the clean up activities, and the Kuwaiti government's failure to stem
the flow of oil into the Persian Gulf. Id. Senator John Chafee publicly blamed the
Kuwaiti government for continuing to allow crude oil to leak into the Persian Gulf. Id.
95. See Int'l Envtl. Rep., July 17, 1991, supra note 28 (describing the funding
problems of the clean up in Kuwait). Peter Schroeder, director of the Oceans and
Coastal Areas Activity Center of UNEP, stated in a press conference on July 5, 1991,
that the program to fund the clean up of the Kuwaiti oil well fires had only received
about one-tenth of the necessary funding. Id. The fund had received only $1.1 million
of the $10 million needed to fund the program. Id. At that time, Japan was the only
actual contributor, while Norway and the Netherlands had pledged $1 million and
$500,000 respectively. Id.
96. See H.R. Con. Res. 55, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991) (condemning Iraq's
ecoterrorism); see also H.R. Con. Res. 57, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991) (denouncing
the oil spills caused by Iraq and calling for Iraq to assume financial responsibility for
its actions against the environment). Both of these resolutions were presented to the
House of Representatives on January 29, 1991. Id.
97. H.R. Con. Res. 55, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991). The resolution condemns
Iraq's "eco-terrorism" in the Persian Gulf. Id. It was sent to the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs. Id. The resolution was sponsored primarily by Representative
Lagomarsino. Id.
98. H.R. Con. Res. 57, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991). This concurrent resolution
deplored the massive oil spill in the Persian Gulf and proclaimed that Saddam Hussein
and Iraq should be held "legally, morally, and financially" liable for this act. Id. The
chief sponsor was Representative Goss. Id. The resolution was sent to the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs. Id.
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funds for the environmental remediation of the region.9 Several sena-
tors proposed similar actions.100
In addition, the Senate designated a Gulf Pollution Task Force to
monitor the clean up.10' Other senators urged a trial for Iraq's Presi-
dent Saddam Hussein for crimes against the environment.102
3. United Nations Actions
The United Nations played a key role in the Persian Gulf War from
its onset in August 1990,103 with the Security Council at the forefront
of conflict resolution activity.10 4 The Security Council's commitment to
preventing ecological destruction in the region began long before the
99. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991). This resolution, sponsored by
Senator Fields, called for "the President, in planning and negotiating Iraq's postwar
settlements with the United States and its allies, [to] insist that 20 percent of Iraq's
future oil revenues be used to pay various costs of the Persian Gulf War." Id. The
resolution was sent to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Id.
100. See S. Con. Res. 23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991) (declaring that Saddam
Hussein and the Iraqi government should be held liable for environmental damage
under United Nations Security Council Resolution 686). This resolution was sponsored
by Senator Mack and Senator Graham. Id. It was sent to the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations for consideration. Id.
101. Ross, supra note 19, at A10; See Gulf Pollution Task Force Assesses Linger-
ing Aftermath of Damage from War, 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 230 (Apr.
24, 1991) (stating the purpose of the Gulf Pollution Task Force). This group was
designed to examine the environmental damage created by Iraq and to assess the long-
term and short-term costs associated with the pollution. Id.
102. See David Freed, Hussein Trial Urged Over Oil Damage, L.A. TIblEs. Mar.
18, 1991 at Al (voicing the opinions of several senators that Saddam Hussein should
be tried for crimes against the environment). Senator John Kerry from Massachusetts
noted his belief that the environmental damage undertaken by Iraqi troops was a "new
category of war crime." Id.
103. See The U.N. Acts, 27 U.N. CHRON., Dec. 1990, at 9-17 (detailing the chro-
nology of United Nations actions in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait). On
August 2, 1990, only hours after the Iraqi invasion, the Security Council convened an
emergency meeting. Id. at 9. During this meeting, the Council passed Resolution 660
calling for Kuwait and Iraq to commence immediate negotiations to solve their
problems. Id. When this resolution proved unsuccessful, the Security Council, on Au-
gust 6, 1990, imposed mandatory economic sanctions on Iraq through Resolution 661.
Id. at 12. The Security Council acted more strongly on August 25, 1990, when it
adopted Resolution 665. Id. at 17. This resolution called for states supporting Kuwait
to create a naval blockade to maximize the effectiveness of economic sanctions against
Iraq. Id.
104. See Resolution 674, supra note 82, at 3 (announcing that the Security Council
would actively oversee the problems in the Persian Gulf until Kuwait regained peace
and independence). Paragraph 11 of the Resolution stated that the Security Council
would "remain actively and permanently seized of the matter until Kuwait has
regained its independence and peace has been restored in conformity with the relevant
resolutions of the Security Council." Id. See also S. Res. 686, U.N. Doc. S/RES/686,
at 3 (1991) [hereinafter Resolution 6861 (restating that the Security Council remained
actively seized of the matter); see also Resolution 687, supra note 81. at 10 (reiterating
the same position).
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fires and oil spills.1"5 This involvement first emerged in Security Coun-
cil Resolution 670, adopted on September 25, 1990, in which the Coun-
cil reminded Iraq of its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion."' 8 As noted in Part II, however, while Iraq is a party to the
Fourth Geneva Convention, it has never ratified or acceded to Protocol
1.107
In Resolution 674 of October 29, 1990, the Security Council stated
in more specific terms how the Fourth Geneva Convention would bind
Iraq.' 0 8 It also invited states to begin collecting data for claims that
their nationals and corporations could make against Iraq. 109 This data
would serve as a basis for compensation under international law. 110
In Security Council Resolution 686, adopted March 2, 1991, the
Council again called for Iraq to accept its obligation under interna-
tional law to compensate parties for losses incurred as a result of its
invasion of Kuwait."' However, the language of the resolution was
weak, calling for Iraq to accept the burden of liability in principle
only. " 2 The Security Council also asked the international community
105. See infra note 106 and accompanying text (explaining the early role of the
Security Council in preventing ecological damage).
106. See S. Res. 670, U.N. Doc S/RES/670, at 3 (1990) (describing Iraq's duties
as a party to the Fourth Geneva Convention). Paragraph 13 states that the:
Fourth Geneva Convention applies to Kuwait, and that as a High Contracting
Party to the Convention, Iraq is bound to comply fully with all its terms, and in
particular is liable under the Convention in respect of the grave breaches com-
mitted by it, as are individuals who commit or order the commission of grave
breaches.
Id.
107. See Saddam: Eco-Criminal?, supra note 43, at 10 (concluding that Iraq is not
legally accountable under Protocol I). Iraq neither signed nor acceded to the agree-
ment, and thus cannot be held liable as a party. Id. Consequently, although the Geneva
Convention as a whole prohibits Iraqi military use of environmental destruction, Proto-
col I does not hold Iraq liable under any of the articles specifically prohibiting such
destruction. Id. See also supra note 44 (explaining the differences between signing and
ratifying a convention).
108. See Resolution 674, supra note 82, at 3 (defining Iraq's compensatory obliga-
tions under international law). The resolution served, inter alia, to remind Iraq that it
would be held liable under international law for any destruction to Kuwait or third
party states, their people, and businesses as a result of the invasion. Id.
109. Id. Paragraph 9 suggests that states collect relevant information for future
claims against Iraq. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Resolution 686, supra note 104, at 2 (demanding that Iraq assume re-
sponsibility for losses stemming from its invasion of Kuwait).
112. Id. The language of this resolution is weaker than that in Resolution 674,
because Paragraph 2(b) calls for Iraq only to "accept in principle its liability under
international law." Id.
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to aid in Kuwait's reconstruction.1 3 This request for aid was honored
by many United Nations member states.1 1'
The Security Council strengthened its language regarding compensa-
tion in Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, which outlined the terms for
ending the hostilities in the Gulf region."" Resolution 687 again pro-
claimed Iraqi liability for any direct loss or damage arising from the
invasion of Kuwait."1 6 The Council noted for the first time that this
harm included environmental damage and the depletion of natural re-
sources."' To further the compensation process, the resolution created
a fund to handle all claims for loss, including environmental claims. 118
The resolution directed the Secretary-General to develop a structure
for the fund pending final approval by the Security Council."19 Iraq
113. Id. at 3. The Council, in preparation for the end of the hostilities, began to
call on member states, the United Nations and its agencies, and other international
organizations, to cooperate and aid Kuwait in reconstruction efforts. Id.
114. See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text (explaining international ac-
tions to help the reconstruction effort in Kuwait). Aid has come in a variety of forms,
including donations of money, equipment, expertise, and help with fire-fighting and
cleaning up oil spills. Id.
115. See Resolution 687, supra note 81, at 4-7 (detailing the terms of the cease-fire
agreement). This resolution, inter alia, called on the Secretary-General to help estab-
lish a border between Kuwait and Iraq, deploy United Nations observers to monitor a
demilitarized zone along the border, and establish a mechanism by which Iraq may
compensate for injuries to claimant parties. Id.
116. See id. at 7 (reiterating Iraq's liability for losses due to its invasion of Ku-
wait). Paragraph 16 of Resolution 687 states that the Council:
[r]eaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq aris-
ing prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed through normal mechanisms,
is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environ-
mental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Gov-
ernments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and
occupation of Kuwait.
Id.
117. See id. (detailing the terms of the cease-fire agreement). Section E, paragraph
16 states that Iraq is responsible under international law for any environmental dam-
age and depletion of natural resources. Id.
118. Id. Paragraph 18 creates a fund to pay compensation for claims and estab-
lishes a commission to manage the money. Id. In view of the fact that Iraq wreaked
such vast havoc on the Kuwaiti oil industry, these claims could serve as a method to
compensate for the environmental destruction as well as economic losses. Because such
claims would seek compensation for the costs of cleaning up the oil fields and spills
necessary to restore the infrastructure of the oil industry, the environmental recovery
would be indirectly included in these costs.
119. Id. Section E, paragraph 19 calls on the Secretary-General to develop plans
for a compensation fund, taking into account the needs of the Iraqi people and econ-
omy, and to develop appropriate methods to evaluate losses and verify claims. Id. The
resolution allows the Secretary-General 30 days to make a recommendation for the
fund. Id. This recommendation must include decisions on matters of administration of
the fund, methods for determining the proper contribution by Iraq based on a percent-
age of its oil revenues, and the appropriate methods for estimating losses. Id.
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grudgingly accepted Resolution 687 when it was presented on April 6,
1991.120
Under Resolution 692, the Security Council established the Gov-
erning Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission. 2'
This commission set standards to govern compensation for parties in-
jured by Iraqi actions during the Persian Gulf War.1 22 In addition, the
commission developed a scheme to ensure that Iraq makes the required
payments to the compensation fund. 23 This plan incorporates the ad-
vice of the United Nations Secretary-General,' 24 as called for in Secur-
ity Council Resolution 687.125
The course of action by the United Nations Security Council strictly
followed established guidelines of international law in holding Iraq re-
sponsible for damaging the environment. It noted the obligations of
states regarding the common environment and relating to responsibility
for marine pollution, as outlined in the Restatement of Foreign Rela-
120. See War in Persian Gulf Area Ends, supra note 85, at 5 (reiterating the state-
ment of Iraqi Foreign Minister Ahmed Hussein). Mr. Hussein stated that Iraq had "no
choice but to accept this resolution." Id.
121. S. Res. 692, U.N. Doc. S/RES/692, at 2 (1991).
122. See Letter Dated 2 August 1991 from the President of the Governing Council
of the United Nations Compensation Commission to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/22885 1, 1 (1991) (explaining the course of action taken by the
Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission since its forma-
tion on May 20, 1991). At its fourth meeting on July 25, 1991, the commission adopted
a structure for compensation procedures. Id. These lengthy guidelines are set out in
Annex I and II of this document. Id. at 3-9. The Commission set criteria for urgent
claims, payments of fixed amounts of damages, consolidated claims, and claims for
actual losses up to $100,000 per person. Id. at 5-9.
123. See id. at 10 (outlining decisions made by the Governing Council of the
United Nations Compensation Commission in its meeting of August 2, 1991). The
commission decided to convene a working group of its members in September 1991 to
develop a proposal to ensure that Iraq makes payments to the compensation fund. Id.
The proposal was to be presented to the Governing Council in October 1991. Id.
124. See id. (describing the sources that the working group should examine). An-
nex 111(c) notes that the working group should heed, inter alia, the report of the Secre-
tary-General, as requested in Security Council Resolution 687. Id. See also Letter
Dated 30 May 1991 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, S/22661 2, 3 (detailing that Secretary-General Javier Perez de
Cuellar's suggested Iraqi contribution to the compensation fund should not exceed a
certain percentage of its oil revenues). The Secretary-General reported that, based on a
price of $20.04 per barrel for Iraqi crude oil, Iraq's export earnings are expected to be
approximately $21 billion in 1993. Id. at 2. Based on this calculation, the Secretary-
General recommended that Iraq pay 30 percent of its annual petroleum-based export
earnings into the compensation fund. Id. at 3. This figure takes into account the need
for civilian imports into Iraq at a level of $8 billion. Id. It also accommodates Iraq's
other foreign debts, totaling $42,097 million as of December 31, 1990, which must be
repaid according to the original terms of the loans. Id.
125. See Resolution 687, supra note 81, at 7 (reaffirming that Iraq is responsible
for compensating injuries stemming from its invasion and occupation of Kuwait and
calling for the Secretary-General to devise a compensation plan).
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tions Law.' 26 Under Resolution 687, the Security Council followed the
proper method for determining remedies for violations of these environ-
mental obligations and for marine pollution. 12 7 Further, the Security
Council followed the general method for redressing breaches of interna-
tional law as prescribed by the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law.128
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Gulf War caused ecological damage on a scale unequalled by
any other conventional military conflict.12 As a result, the interna-
tional community is now aware of the grave implications of such de-
struction on the environment and the huge expense of undertaking
cleanup activities. Consequently, it is incumbent upon states to prevent
such destruction in the future. Because it played an integral part in
ending the hostilities in the Persian Gulf, oversaw the cleanup opera-
tions, and established a program for compensating victims of environ-
mental damage, the United Nations is the appropriate international
body to prescribe preventative measures to protect the environment
during future military actions.
126. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 601 (asserting that states have obligations
to the environment). Among other things, Section 601 notes that a nation is liable for
any serious damage resulting from a violation of its obligations, whether to the environ-
ment of another nation or to its property, or to persons or property within that nation's
territory, jurisdiction, or control. Id. See also id. § 603 (explaining a state's liability
for polluting the marine environment). Section 603 notes that a nation is required to
take the necessary measures practicable under the circumstances, either individually or
collectively with other nations, to avert, diminish, and control pollution causing or
threatening to cause serious injury to the marine environment. Id.
127. See id. § 602 (explaining remedies for environmental damage). This section
states, inter alia, that a nation liable to another state for violation of Section 601 is
subject to general interstate remedies (Section 902) to avert, diminish, or cease the
activity threatening or causing the violation, and to make reparations for the injury. Id.
See also id. § 604 (stating remedies for marine pollution). Among other things, Section
604 states that a nation liable to another nation state for a violation of the principles of
Section 603 is subject to general remedies (Section 902) to avert, diminish, or discon-
tinue the action threatening or causing pollution, and to make reparations for the in-
jury. Id.
128. See id. § 901 (explaining the remedy for a breach of international law). Sec-
tion 901 states that under international law, a state that violates a legal duty to another
nation is obligated to cease the violation and, in most cases, to make reparation, includ-
ing restitution or compensation for loss or injury. Id.
129. See Barnaby, supra note 1, at 168 (declaring that the Persian Gulf War was
the most environmentally destructive war in history).
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A. ACTIONS THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD HAVE TAKEN
The United Nations supervised the cease-fire agreement that ended
hostilities in the Gulf War. Among other things, it directed Iraq to
compensate victims of the war and invited Iraq to make stronger com-
mitments to certain treaties. However, the United Nations elected to
forego the opportunity to exact tougher concessions from Iraq.
Security Council Resolution 687 called on Iraq to comply with its
duties as a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the
Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteri-
ological Methods of Warfare. 130 In addition, the United Nations in-
vited Iraq to become a party to the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Bi-
ological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, a treaty which
it had not previously joined as a party.' 3 '
The resolutions sponsored by the Security Council demonstrated the
Council's concern about possible Iraqi chemical and biological weapon
attacks, and the environmental destruction already perpetrated during
the Gulf War."'1 This concern should have prompted the United Na-
tions to require Iraq to become a party to Protocol I. This step would
have followed logically from the United Nations' other requests for
Iraqi treaty ratification. Because Iraq was already a party to the 1925
Geneva Protocol banning the use of poisonous gases and bacteriological
warfare, and because the United Nations asked Iraq to ratify the re-
lated 1972 Convention against the development of bacteriological
weapons, it follows that as a party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
Iraq should now become a party to Protocol I.
The United Nations should have called upon Iraq to ratify both Pro-
tocol I and the ENMOD Convention as conditions of the cease-fire
under Resolution 687. Ratification would help to ensure that Iraq will
not further damage the environment in future military conflicts. These
treaty ratifications, however, would not be useful in sanctioning Iraq
130. See Resolution 687, supra note 81, at 4 (stating that Iraq should uncondition-
ally heed its responsibilities under this convention). Paragraph 7 of Resolution 687 "in-
vites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bac-
teriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 ...." Id.
131. Id. at 5. Paragraph 7 invited Iraq "to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972." Id.
132. Resolution 687, supra note 81, at 7 (declaring Iraqi responsibility for environ-
mental damage and the depletion of natural resources). The United Nations believed
the damage was serious enough to hold Iraq monetarily responsible for the cleanup
under Resolution 687. Id.
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for its role in the Gulf War. Because Protocol I and the ENMOD Con-
vention are not generally considered customary international law, 33 the
obligations these treaties entail cannot be triggered until a nation be-
comes a party. Therefore, ratifying Protocol I and the ENMOD Con-
vention as part of the cease-fire agreement would only provide a means
by which to sanction Iraq's actions in future conflicts.134
B. STEPS TO MAKE CURRENT TREATIES MORE EFFECTIVE
The actions of the United Nations may suffice to compensate victims
for the environmental damage stemming from this particular military
action. The international community, however, should strive to avoid
such monumental destruction during future armed conflicts.
It is clear that nations in the Persian Gulf region, and the interna-
tional community in general, regard the Middle East as a sensitive area
in need of peace and preservation. This was clearly stated in the 1977
General Assembly Resolution calling for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
in the Middle East. 3 5 Consequently, it follows that Middle Eastern
133. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (noting that neither the ENMOD
Convention nor Protocol I is part of customary international law).
134. But see L. HENKIN, supra note 44, at 364, 366 (providing an example of
liability when an action violates customary international law). The International Mili-
tary Tribunal in the Nuremberg Trials, concluding that genocide, a crime against hu-
manity, was a product of common international law, held Nazi war criminals accounta-
ble for the knowledge that their genocidal acts were wrong while they were committing
them. Id. Consequently, the tribunal held that the acts were punishable when they were
carried out. Id. Along this line of reasoning, the principle of nullem crimen sine lege, or
no crime without law, is not applicable because the norms of common international
law, rather than a particular statute, made the Nazis' actions criminal. Id. Therefore,
no bar existed against the prosecution of the Nazi war criminals. Id.
Similarly, because international law consists of conventions, treaties, judicial rulings,
and internationally accepted customs, rather than statutes, the theory of ex post facto,
applicable to domestic statutes, cannot be applied to international law. Id. at 365. The
application of the ex post facto principle to common international law would thwart
the development of common international law. Id. This same reasoning could have been
used to hold Iraq responsible for environmental damage if Protocol I and the ENMOD
Convention were part of customary international law. Iraq could thus have been held
liable under the treaties even though it had not become a party to them.
135. See Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the
Middle East, 1977 U.N.Y.B. 32, U.N. Sales No. E.79.I.1, 32-33 (delineating the text
and basic information about the resolution). The resolution was sponsored by a group
of nations in the Persian Gulf region, including Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Yemen.
Id. at 32. A wide range of nations throughout the world voted in favor of the resolu-
tion, including many in the Middle East, such as Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Oman and Syria.
Id. The resolution urges, inter alia, that all parties involved heed the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a means of fostering the objectives of the
resolution. Id. at 33.
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states wish to avoid debilitating destruction to the environment and to
the oil industry as a result of conventional warfare.1 38
The United Nations can achieve this goal by strengthening the cur-
rent provisions of Protocol I and the ENMOD Convention. The crea-
tion of a new resolution is unnecessary because the United Nations has
not yet tested the full effect of these existing conventions. It is possible
that the United Nations could sufficiently modify Protocol I and the
ENMOD Convention to satisfactorily prevent environmental damage in
future conflicts.
1. Protocol I
In light of the environmental destruction and the threat to human
health Iraq created by destroying and sabotaging Kuwaiti oil facilities,
it is clear that oil fields and terminals can unleash extremely dangerous
forces. It is therefore advisable that the United Nations revise Article
56 of Protocol I to add oil facilities to the existing list of potentially
dangerous peacetime installations which currently includes only dams,
dikes, and nuclear electrical generating stations. 13 The inclusion of oil
facilities would serve the multiple purposes of protecting the environ-
ment from fires and oil spills, safeguarding the major industry of the
Persian Gulf region from destruction during wartime, and keeping pe-
troleum supplies flowing to the world during conflicts.
Further, adding oil facilities to the list in Article 56 would allow
compensation for environmental damage under Protocol I without hav-
ing to satisfy the "widespread, long-lasting and severe" requirements
under Articles 35 and 55.138 If a state violated Article 56 through the
destruction of oil wells or terminals, compensation for loss could
136. See ALl EL-HAKIM, THE MIDDLE EASTERN STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
22-24 (1979) (enunciating regional and international steps to establish laws to control
marine pollution in the Middle East). On the international level, Jordan, Lebanon, Ku-
wait, Saudi Arabia, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, and Syria are parties to the Interna-
tional Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil. Id. at 22-23. On
the regional level, Bahrain, Iran, Kuwait, Oman, Iraq, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates adopted and signed the Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-
operation in the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution and a Protocol
Concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful
Substances in Cases of Emergency. Id. at 23.
137. See Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 56 (limiting the scope of peacetime installa-
tions covered under the treaty to dams, dikes, and nuclear power plants). Under Article
56, armed forces are forbidden to attack these facilities "even when these objects are
military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and conse-
quent severe losses among the civilian population." Id.
138. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (defining the criteria of widespread,
long-lasting, and severe).
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foreseeably include reparations for the actual monetary value of oil lost
and for the cost of the cleanup effort. This would result in a back-
handed form of compensation for environmental loss.139
2. ENMOD Convention
The United Nations should revise the ENMOD Convention to make
it applicable to situations like that of the environmental destruction in
the Gulf War. In its present form, the convention prohibits only the use
of the environment as a weapon of destruction, rather than prohibiting
devastation of the environment itself."0 "Environmental modification
techniques," forbidden under the treaty, require purposeful manipula-
tion of the earth and atmosphere. 1 One could argue that such manip-
ulation occurred during the Gulf War. The destruction caused major
disruption in the composition of the air in Kuwait and changed the
climate throughout the Persian Gulf region.142 One may also argue that
the oil spills altered the composition of the hydrosphere.1 43 As men-
tioned earlier, it is clear that the degree of devastation would meet the
long-term, severe or widespread criteria. 4
The ENMOD Convention could apply to the Gulf War situation if
nations view the destruction of the oil wells and creation of the spills as
the use of a natural part of the environment, crude oil, for hostile mili-
tary purposes. This is not, however, the common interpretation of the
situation. Rather, the popular view is that Iraq used man-made oil
139. See id. art. 91 (defining responsibility for violations of the treaty). Article 91
allows for the compensation of losses created by a breach of Protocol I. Id. This section
states that "[a] party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions of
this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces." Id.
140. See Saddam: Eco-Criminal?, supra note 43, at II (explaining that the EN-
MOD Convention is meant only to forbid the use of the environment as a weapon).
141. See ENMOD Convention, supra note 42, art. II (defining environmental mod-
ification techniques). Under the ENMOD Convention the term "environmental modifi-
cation techniques" means "any technique for changing - through the deliberate ma-
nipulation of natural processes - the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth,
including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space." Id.
142. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (describing climatic and air
quality changes in the Persian Gulf region). See also Goldblat, supra note 39, at 108
(noting the review committee's interpretation of the terms in Article II of the ENMOD
Convention). The Review Committee cited several examples as representative of phe-
nomena resulting from environmental modification techniques, including: "an upset in
the ecological balance of the region," "changes in weather patterns," and "changes in
climatic patterns." Id.
143. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (describing the extent of, and
the destruction from, the oil spills in the Persian Gulf).
144. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (defining the ENMOD criteria of
widespread, long-lasting and severe).
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wells, and not naturally occurring crude oil as its weapons, thus render-
ing the ENMOD Convention inapplicable. 145
There are two ways to characterize Iraq's military actions in the
Gulf: offensive and defensive. If one argues that Iraq created the oil
spills to advance the military objective of wiping out Saudi Arabian
desalination plants, 146 and began the oil well fires to cause destruction
of the Kuwaiti economy and its industrial base, 47 then the ENMOD
Convention would clearly apply because the Iraqis carried out the de-
struction of the environment for hostile purposes. Conversely, if one
portrays Iraqi operations strictly as a defense tactic,1 48 it may be ar-
gued that the fires were protection for retreating Iraqi troops, and the
oil spills were a defense against potential Allied amphibious invasions
on the Kuwaiti shoreline. Under this interpretation hostile intent is
more difficult to prove, and thus the ENMOD Convention may not be
applicable.
If the environment is the focus of concern, these slight distinctions
should not dictate whether or not the ENMOD Convention is enforcea-
ble.149 The level of environmental damage, rather than the underlying
excuse for the destruction, should be the decisive factor. Under its cur-
rent form, the ENMOD Convention allows for enforcement only if the
state causing the damage admits a hostile intent behind its actions. 10
The parties should alter the convention to exclude the need for hostile
intent, thus allowing the convention to apply to military environmental
destruction, both offensive and defensive. 151 In addition, ENMOD
145. See Saddam: Eco-Criminal?, supra note 43 (explaining that the ENMOD
Convention is not applicable to the Persian Gulf situation). The article states that "the
convention is meant to proscribe using the environment as a weapon - creating floods to
wipe out troops, for instance - rather than merely damaging the environment. There-
fore, although the oil well fires or any deliberate spills in the gulf undoubtedly had
climatic and ecological effects, the treaty would not apply." Id. at 11.
146. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (explaining that the oil spills were
created to destroy desalination plants).
147. See Parmalee, supra note 16, at Al (detailing the major destruction to the
Kuwaiti oil industry).
148. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (speculating that the oil spills were
designed to thwart an Allied amphibious landing on the shores of Kuwait); see also
Parmalee, supra note 16, at Al (stating that the oil well fires were set by retreating
Iraqi troops).
149. See Westing, supra note 7, at 664 (discussing the ENMOD Convention's re-
quirement of hostile intent). The ENMOD Convention prohibits environmental altera-
tions only when carried out with the intent to disrupt natural processes for hostile
objectives. Id.
150. Id. Purposeful hostile intent may be hard to prove without an admission by
the perpetrator. Id.
151. Id. Westing suggests that the convention be amended to include "any hostile
environmental manipulation that could reasonably be expected to result in a prohibited
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should cover all environmental damage, whether caused by natural or
man-made instruments. Subtle differences of opinion as to the cause of
the damage should not be consequential for enforcement purposes.
Further, the United Nations should repeal the threshold require-
ments of "widespread, long-lasting or severe." If the ENMOD Conven-
tion is truly intended to protect the environment, the destruction should
not have to rise to a monumental level before the treaty becomes en-
forceable.' 52 The United Nations Security Council should determine
the required environmental destruction on a case-by-case basis. No
claim should be automatically excluded because of its magnitude under
the terms of the convention alone. This same reasoning should apply to
Protocol I to eliminate the requirements of "widespread, long-lasting
and severe" because that treaty applies the terms more narrowly. 1 3
To further the implementation of these changes to the ENMOD
Convention, a party-state, most appropriately Kuwait, should attempt
to persuade a majority of the parties to convene a conference to
strengthen this treaty. 54 In light of the fact that the first review oc-
curred in 1984, the member states should now convene a second review
of the convention. Even if a majority in favor of a conference in the
near future cannot be achieved, a tenth-year review conference will be
possible in 1994. Under the rules of the convention, fewer parties are
required to call for a ten-year review than are required to call for a
review in other cases. 55
effect even if the environmental modification was not meant as the primary form of
attack." Id.
152. See id. at 663-64 (suggesting that the damage thresholds be dropped from the
ENMOD Convention). Allowing lower levels of hostile environmental modification per-
mits preparation for the use of these techniques. Id. These limits to enforcement were
originally designed to prevent the convention from becoming the basis for frivolous
complaints. DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK 1984, supra note 45, at 458. It is, however,
equally important that the required destruction not be as immense as that in the Per-
sian Gulf to be covered by the ENMOD Convention.
153. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (noting the seriousness of environ-
mental destruction necessary for the application of Protocol 1).
154. See ENMOD Convention, supra note 42, art. VIII (explaining the require-
ments for a five-year review). Article VIII, paragraph 2 states that "at intervals of not
less than five years thereafter, a majority of the States Parties to this Convention may
obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary, the convening of a
conference with the same objectives." Id. Consequently, a majority of the party-states
may propose a conference meeting to review the effectiveness of the ENMOD Conven-
tion. Id.
155. See id. (explaining the requirements for a ten-year review). Article VIII, par-
agraph 3 provides that if no review has been called for within ten years of the initial
review (1984), the Depositary shall ask parties if a new review is necessary. Id. If
either ten or one-third of the parties, whichever is a lesser number, wish to convene a
review, then one will be arranged. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Although the United Nations developed a plan under which Iraq is
required to pay compensation for its acts of environmental destruc-
tion,15 this is hardly the ideal method to dissuade future perpetrators
of ecological devastation. Reliance on oil revenues, or a state's future
earnings from other sources, will not be practicable in all situations.
Under such a scheme, poorer nations may be able to avoid compensat-
ing for their acts of environmental destruction during armed conflicts
due to their inability to pay. More appropriately, parties to the EN-
MOD Convention and Protocol I should strengthen these treaties so
that their provisions may have a deterrent effect on states inclined to
destroy the environment during military hostilities.
Just as the Vietnam War acted as a catalyst for the development of
the ENMOD Convention and Protocol 1,157 the events of the Gulf War
should trigger efforts to fine tune these treaties so that they can truly
prevent environmental destruction during future military conflicts. In
addition, the treaties should create effective mechanisms to sanction the
perpetrators of environmental destruction and compensate victims who
incur losses. Finally, Protocol I and the ENMOD Convention must be
modified to allow parties to apply them in a broader range of less dras-
tic circumstances. The international community is in need of a deter-
rent to environmental destruction during warfare, rather than simply a
remedial plan after nations carry out such devastation.
156. See supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text (detailing the United Na-
tions compensation plan).
157. See supra notes 39, 40 & 48 and accompanying text (delineating the history
of the development of Protocol I and the ENMOD Convention).
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